Reviving India's Foreign policy.... Part IV

07 June 2009

Reviving India’s Foreign policy - Part IV



All nations, big or small, pursue some of the foreign policy goals and objectives to secure their territorial sovereignty, internal security, political stability and economic prosperity.Foreign policy then refers to the relations of a nation in an attempt to achieve a set of given objectives The nation ordinarily seeks to gain those objectives through diplomacy.
A nation usually has several broad aims, which remain the same even though political parties, or its form of government may change. It is an accepted dictum of foreign policy and diplomacy that “In international relations there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests”. Broad national objectives are generally supported by specific actions. Shaping foreign policy involves makinga series of choices among a variety of alternative possible courses. Foreign policy is a continuous process because each new step depends on a previous action and the changes it causes in the behaviour of other nations, as a consequence.
Indian foreign policy under the UPA government (or any nation’s foreign policy for that matter) could thus be seen in the light of these factors. However, a careful analysis of the balance-sheet of India’s foreign policy during this period does not present a rosy picture. On the contrary, India’s upward trajectory towards reaching a global power status following its nuclear weaponization tests of 1998 appears to have been lost somewhere in the middle during 2004-09 and it has stumbled along the way in retaining its strategic autonomy in foreign policy formations.
Many foreign policy experts have described the foreign policy of India under Dr Manmohan Singh during 2004-2009 as ‘wasted years’ because of his near-obsession with pushing through the Indo-US nuke deal at any cost. This deal may have some merits of course, but the overall impression in thediplomatic circles across the world was that Indian foreign policy became uni-directional and one-dimensional, as opposed to a multi-dimensional focus required to secure its wide national security interests.
It was a far cry from the policy initiatives during earlier regimes during which a different kind of momentum had been built. Even as we have crossed the first half of 2009, India does not seem to figure in the global strategic and power calculus as a nation with strategic autonomy in foreign policy formulations and decision making and today, India is being perceived as more of a US camp follower on the lines of UK and Japan.

There seems to be a strange parallel between Pandit Nehru obsession with China and Dr Manmohan Singh’s fixation with the USA. Nehru was mystified by China and became oblivious to the strategic and national security dangers that lurked as a result of romanticizing China. In the same way, Dr Singh romanticized USA in terms of the Indo-US nuke deal at the cost of other pressing strategic dangers to India.
Secondly, Indian foreign policy became personalized in Pandit Nehru and PMO had a major say in the foreign policy making. The PMO under Dr Manmohan Singh tried to emulate the same. That time it was Nehru and Krishna Menon and 2009 edition of 1960s was Manmohan Singh and Shiv Shankar Menon. The wisdom of putting all the eggs in one basket was challenged in 1962, yet again the lesson seems to be lost 37 years down the line. Are we repeating history or condemning it?
The US-centric orientation of India’s foreign policy during this period could be seen in the light of the fact that it was forced into engaging Pakistan in peace dialogues under American pressure. India also signed the Havana Agreement with Pakistan on counter-terrorism cooperation, even as the public opinion was against it.
In addition, India was on the verge of gifting away the strategic Siachen sector to Pakistan. Had the Indian Army not applied emergency brakes, India would have lost hold of its vital strategic territory like Nehru lost Aksai Chin to China.
What is all the more obvious is that Obama administration too is following the same US-Pak centric policy and India has been forced to reconcile more than needed, even at the cost of adverse domestic public opinion. On the other hand, the Indo-Us nuke deal which remained the centre-piece of India’s foreign policy, has yet to achieve its full finalization.
In the process, India seems to have missed the bus in terms of securing a seat in the global high table and emerging as a global power of consequence. India needs to break out of her self-imposed straitjacket of limited perspectives and limited options. India has not only lost the perspective and an independent foreign policy approach on Europe and other parts of the world. It has also lost heavily in terms of collateral damage to its regional strategic interests and particularly with regard to Pakistan, its policy was no longer determined by its own” thinking” but by continuous” American pressure to fall in line”.
It is thus very important that India’s foreign policy undergoes a total re-calibration and careful calculation in the face of the emerging challenges from many quarters. At present, our foreign policy is merely a ‘reactive’ one and not a proactive one – formulated by foreign policy experts and think-tanks.


Suggestions

India has to search for a more competent team of Ministers for running the MEA with the active support of all its wings and think- tanks and academic institutions on international issues.
It has to take a fresh look at the existing pool of IFS posted around in its consulates and embassies across the world and a make a realistic assessment on the actual requirement on all major regions of the world in terms of translating Indian foreign policy into action, as well as providing feedback on a daily basis.
MEA’s scope and purview of action needs to be given a fresh look and more experts and specialized manpower needs to be deployed at many places in the light of changing paradigms of diplomacy and mode of diplomatic engagements.
Apart from the serving cops of IFS, whose number is less than 1000 for catering to such a vast canvas, there is need for developing a heavy-duty battery of experts and encourage more “specialized institutions” across the country to engage in study programmes on various regions of the world and come out with fresh findings.
JNU alone cannot be adequate for such international study programmes. There is need for more such centres and institutes specializing in external affairs studies, with more resources and manpower and new study programmes.
The new foreign secretary Ms Nirupama Rao should also undertake a comprehensive review of the MEA, with the aim of detecting the “loopholes” and plugging them effectively in the existing set up and strengthening the management of diplomatic system .
There should be internal scanning and posting of officers in sensitive locations and regions should be done purely on merit, than other considerations.
There should be more effective and meaningful interaction of think tanks and specialized institutions with MEA core group to give more concrete informationand updates on all areas of concern to draft a more calibrated foreign policy approach on a continuous basis rather than the knee-jerk reactions.
Last but not the least, the PMO should at best play a ‘supervisory’ role in foreign policy matters and not a ‘suffocatingly proactive’ role, till such time it has a Prime Minister who has an international profile and the charisma to go with it. Till such time, foreign policy formulation should be left to foreign policy experts and not allowed to be hijacked by policemen and finance whizkids.

One hopes that the UPA government in its second term, takes a serious look at these parameters and sets the MEA in order for a bigger set of diplomatic challenges ahead – that is, if it doesn’t want its foreign policy to be an ‘alien’ one.