सोमवार, 22 फ़रवरी 2010

India's Anti-dote

14 February 2009( Presentation in a Seminar)

INDIA'S ANTI-DOTE (DOCTRINE ON TERRORISM EXTERMINATION)


Terrorism is today a trans-national, globally ubiquitous phenomenon. It has never known any frontiers. Terrorism thrives mainly on three things: (i) brainwashing the youth through sustained misinformation, (ii) financing the terrorists through money and arms and ammunition, (iii) raising the bogey of religion. Thus, at the outset, it needs to be borne in mind that terrorism needs a hard, cold-blooded approach. The response has to cut down entirely on the emotional side to the response, though strong emotions are a logical corollary in the aftermath of such incidents as Mumbai attacks.
What is needed today is a well thought-out doctrine on extermination of terrorism. Most importantly, an environment has to be created where people are convinced and motivated to take the lead actively in countering terrorism. They need to be told that as masses are the worst sufferers of terror attacks, the lead to counter terrorism effectively has to come from the people (cite the instance of Punjab where terrorism was repulsed due to people's active involvement). People's active support – financially and in providing manpower should convince them that it is not just another political gimmick. However, this initiative should remain free from politicisation and its success lies in its sound and rigorous implementation.
This initiative must be entirely indigenous in nature, without any foreign help of any kind – ideologically, or financially. India must demonstrate to the world that it is entirely capable of defeating terrorism on its own.
For the sake of clarity, the proposed Doctrine would have the following sub-parts:

I. Security
II. Finance
III. Intelligence
IV. Handling aftermath of a terror attack
V. Media controls and information dissemination

DOABLES:

I ) SECURITY –
(a) Electronic multi-purpose ID card: To make security foolproof, a concept of a computerised, electronic multi-purpose ID card has to be implemented. The ID card should also carry the name of the Indian domicile state to which the person belongs. It should carry regularly updated personal and professional details of the individual. This multi-purpose ID card should be developed and produced in such a manner that it is almost impossible to duplicate or forge it. In this way, a centralised database can be maintained, particularly for anti-social elements and criminals.
(b) Registering and deregistering: Introduce the principle followed in Germany of 'registering' and 'deregistering', when people move from one state to another to settle down permanently. Ensure that there are no legal cases pending, or any outstanding personal or bank loans against the person.

(c) Citizen Task Force: In every state, a Citizen Task Force must be raised. The Task Force should include able-bodied youth between the ages of 18 and 35. Each city could ideally have 100-200 youth (depending on the size and population of the city) who are given special commando and specific anti-terror training, as well as equipment. A sub-division of the Task Force could include professionals who could counter the medical/psychological fallouts of a terror attack. The help of institutions like Armed Forces and NSG could be sought in this connection to train and equip this citizen force. For obvious reasons, Mumbai could be made a model city. If successful, the initiative could be replicated in other cities too.
(d) Introduce Conscription: Introduce conscription (with a compulsory five year military service) for all able-bodied men and women between the age of 18 and 50. This will not only instil self-discipline among the youth, but also ensure that there is no dearth of manpower in our Defence Forces at any point of time.
(e) Make Martial Arts compulsory in Schools/colleges: Martial arts must be made compulsory in all schools/colleges throughout the country. Those students who excel in martial arts, could be later on considered to be inducted into the Citizen Task Force and given commando training. This step would also come in handy, just in case there is a terror scare in any educational institution, as schools/children are one of the must vulnerable sections. A precedent exists (though not in India ) when students were made hostages in a school in Chechnya .

II) FINANCE:
(a) Terror Relief Fund: A separate Terror Relief Fund (TRF) needs to be constituted where money/donations accruing from various sources must be deposited. The Fund should be subjected to rigorous annual audits by uninterested, objective third party.
(b) Voluntary donation: A huge corpus of fund is the urgent need of the hour to counter the menace of terrorism. People could be asked to donate a sum annually (depending on each one's paying capacity and one's wherewithal). The entire mechanism has to be a non-government one and totally voluntary in nature, with absolutely no coercion whatsoever. However, people have to be convinced that the money will be utilized most judiciously and it is not just one of those money-spinning schemes. This money must be used to equip, arm and train a sizeable 'citizen force' and given commando training, to forcefully counter any terrorist attack Mumbai needs to be made a model city in this regard and could be taken up as a pilot case.
(c) Budgetary support: A certain percentage of the Union Budget (say 0.5 per cent) could be kept aside every year and the money utilised to pay compensation to terror victims. Similarly, states could be also be asked to set aside a percentage of their budgets to meet various expenses arising out of a terrorist attack.


(d) Donations from business/industrial houses: Business/Industrial houses should be motivated to donate liberally to Terror Relief Fund. Those business/industrial houses which make handsome donations could be given attractive tax concessions.
(e) No misuse of funds: This is one of the singular most important factors which could mean the difference between success, or failure against terrorism. Stringent checks and balances must be introduced to keep a track of the income/expenditure of TRF. If any one is found misusing funds earmarked for TRF, must be handed a death sentence.

III) Intelligence:
(a) Collecting inputs: The existing intelligence agencies must be overhauled and toned up thoroughly. A central command and control authority has to be put in place, where all the inputs are gathered and analysed. This control authority must give out necessary instructions on all issues pertaining to terrorism. The different intelligent agencies must be asked to concentrate on gathering inputs from states that share borders with our troublesome neighbours – for instance, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Uttaranchal, Uttar Pradesh, Seven Sister states of North East, Tamil Nadu, not to forget Jammu and Kashmir .
(b) Ground Zero contacts: Intelligence agencies must collect inputs on a daily basis from contacts at the ground level – for instance, fishermen, villagers living in border areas, tribals and street kids. The help of fishermen can be sought in patrolling the vast coastal borders.
(c) Pre-empt terror strikes: Till now, our intelligence has suffered from one major flaw. Despite inputs, we have rarely succeeded in pre-empting and thwarting a terror attack. At some stage, counter-terror strategy has to start thinking and planning like terrorists. Vulnerable targets have to be identified in advance. Often, terrorists will strike in crowded places – but in future, the attacks are likely to target the most vulnerable places - educational institutions, for instance.

IV) Handling aftermath of a terror attack:
(a) Exterminating the terrorists: Terrorists must be exterminated with minimum collateral damage. If a terrorist is arrested, give him only 72 hours to divulge the plot. With or without information, don't give him 73rd hour to live. No cases, no laws, no courts. For public consumption, it can be said that the terrorist consumed cyanide capsules, or show him as a human bomb and liquidate him.
(b) Casualties: The first and the foremost challenge in a terror attack is ascertaining the exact number of casualties. This should not vary and again centralised authority plays a crucial role.

(c) Injured: Urgent first aid and prompt hospitalisation can save precious lives. Ask all private medical practitioners, paramedics and nursing staff to pool in their services to the hospitals. A pool of such medicos can be prepared beforehand in all major cities and their credentials checked beforehand. Mock exercises from time to time can keep them on the alert all the time.
(d) Compensation: Though financial compensation can never compensate the lives lost, adequate compensation from the voluntary donations can be used to pay compensation. Business houses too could be asked to provide jobs to individuals of needy families.

V) Media Controls and Information Dissemination:
(a) Media – particularly the electronic media, and more so television thrives on visuals and 'sound bites'. Immediacy is both – its biggest appeal and its biggest drawback at the same time. The medium itself discourages deeper thought and analysis. It lives from one minute to another. In doing so, it has lost the sense, balance and proportion of what constitutes news. Thus, in specific cases of terror attacks, media, both print and electronic has to be kept at a safe distance from the scene of action.
(b) Media persons have to be confined to one place – a seemingly impossible task and given briefings by a designated authority from time to time. It could well be thrice a day.
(c) For the benefit of electronic media, after the attack has been foiled, an official cameraperson could provide the photographers and cameramen photographers and footage of the place.
(d) Media should be told not to provide publicity to the terrorists, but rather to the counter-terror operation. Personal and vivid details of the terrorists too need not be given. A terrorist does not have any name, religion and face – he is simply a terrorist.
(e) Media persons too should be given specific training in covering counter-terror operations and warlike situations. Only trained media personnel, with adequate protective gear/equipment must be allowed to cover terror attacks.

***

(The aim of this doctrine is not to replace the existing mechanisms but only to supplement them. Armed Forces, paramilitary forces, NSG and police forces have to be modernised and strengthened. Intelligence agencies too need to be equipped with latest equipment et al. People's participation in this doctrine is only intended to act as a 'second line of defence', which can ward off any future terror attack).

Part II

TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN INDIA – A DECADAL CHRONOLOGY

Date Place Fatalities
March 12, 1993 Mumbai 257
1997 Brahmaputra Mail Bombing
Feb 14, 1998 Coimbatore 46
Oct 1, 2001 J&K Assembly Complex 35
Dec 13, 2001 Parliament Complex 7
Dec 21, 2002 Kurnool Train Crash 20
Sep 10, 2002 Rafiganj Rail 130
Feb 27, 2002 Godhra
Sep 24, 2002 Akshardham, Gujarat 31
Mar 13, 2003 Mumbai commuter train 11
May 14, 2003 Army camp, Jammu 30
Aug 25, 2003 Mumbai – car bombs 52
Aug 15, 2004 Assam 16
2005 Jaunpur train bombing 13
July 5, 2005 Ram Janmabhoomi, Ayodhya 0
Oct 29, 2005 New Delhi – three locations 70
Mar 7, 2006 Sankatmochan, Varansi and
Varanasi Cantonment 21
July 11, 2006 Seven serial blasts in Mumbai 209
Sep 8, 2006 Serial blasts in Malegaon 37
Feb 18, 2007 Samjhauta Express 68
May 18, 2007 Mecca Masjid, Hyderabad 13
Aug 25, 2007 Lumbini Park , Hyderabad 42
Oct 11, 2007 Ajmer 3
Oct 14, 2007 Ludhiana on Eid-ul-Fitr 6
Nov 24, 2007 Courthouse complexes in Lucknow , 16
Varanasi and Faizabad
May 13, 2008 Jaipur 63
July 25, 2008 Bangalore 2
July 26, 2008 Ahmedabad 29
Sep 13, 2008 Delhi – five blasts 21
Sep 27, 2008 Mehrauli, New Delhi 1
Sep 29, 2008 Maharashtra and Gujarat 10
Sep 29, 2008 Bike blasts in Malegaon 7
Oct 1, 2008 Agartala 4
Oct 21, 2008 Imphal 17
Oct 30, 2008 Assam 77
Nov 26, 2008 Mumbai 171
Jan. 01 and 09 Guwahati 7 and 4

A total number of 36 terrorist attacks in 10 years, making it 3.6 attacks per year.
Total of 1, 535 people killed over a decade, or 153 people killed every year.
Most of the attacks have happened in the latter half of months – i.e between 15th and 30th of each month.
Mumbai and North East have been attacked five (5) times each, and New Delhi four (4) times.
In 2008, the pattern since attack in Jaipur has been that the terrorists have been striking on alternate months. Consider this pattern:
May 13 – Jaipur
June ---- No attack
July 26 – Ahmedabad
August – No attack
September 13 - Delhi
October - No attack
November 26 - Mumbai
December - No attack till now
January 1,09 Guwahati
February Where ??

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